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Wage Changes in Job Changes
ABSTRACT
This is a study of short and longer-runwage gains observed
in moving from one job (firm) to the next. Short-runwage cams
are defined as wacie chanc,es over the survey year bracketing themove
minus the onportunity cost of moving. The atteris measuredby waqe
arowth of a subcirouo of stayers whose mobility behavior and other
charactristjcs are the same as of the current periodmovers.
Loncier-run wage gains are defined as the difference inwages between
two successive jobs at the same tenure levels, net ofexperience,
again net of opnortunity costs.
Wace gains of movers are generally positive,except for layoffs
of older workers. A large part of the gain is due to the lesser
wacie growth on the job of movers compared to (all) stayers. This
is consistent with below average amounts of on thejob training
observed for movers compared to all workers.
Wage gains of quits exceed those of layoffs, despite similar
wage levels and wage growth on the preceding job. Wage gains of
older movers are smaller compared to gains ofyounger movers, both
in quits and in layoffs. Differences in search conditions and in





WAGE CHANGES IN JOB CHANGES
Jacob Mincer
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Inthis study we estimate short and longer—run wage changes observed in
the. period of moving from one job to the next. Short—runwagechangesare
defined as the difference between the starting wage on the new job and the
wage observed a year before on the old job. Longer—run changes are defined as
the difference in wages between the two jobs at the same tenure levels, net of
experience. In effect, this change in wages is measured by the shift of the
tenure—wage profile in the successive jobs.Wage gains of movers
are usually estimated by the difference between wage growth of movers and
wage growth of all stayers during the observation period. Heterogeneity in
wage profiles of workers creates a selectivity bias in using all stayers as
the control group. We try to reduce the bias by using a more appropriate
control group, namely of those stayers whose mobility behavior, in addition to
other observable characteristics, is similar to that of current period
movers. Their wage growth on the job proxies for the wage growth foregone by
movers.
wage changes of movers were estimated in the period 1970—1981, as well as
in the more recent subperiod 1976—1981, for white male workers, non—students,
up to age 60. We distinguished subgroups of young (first decade of work
experience) and of all other, more experienced workers. We also distinguished
movers by type of separation, quit and layoff. Other characteristics, such as
education, marital status and union membership were used as independent
variables in tWe statistical regression equations.
Findings in both the shorter and longer run reveal similar facts: Wage
gains of movers are generally positive,' except for layoffs airiong the older—2—
workers. Wage gains in quits exceed wage gains in layoffs. Wage gains of
older movers are smaller (or even negative) than wages of young movers. This
is partly due to the greater frequency of layoffs (compared to quits) among
older workers.
These systematic patterns are clearly observed, when the mobility wage
gains are related to the group of next—period movers rather than to the less
appropriate control group of all stayers. Indeed, a large part of the gain is
due to the lesser wage growth on the job of movers compared to stayers. This
is consistent with findings in our previous studies, according to which less
frequent movers receive more job training and grow more rapidly on the job.2
This is one reason for the flatter life—time trajectories of frequent
movers. The other, according to our present [indings is that, with the
exception of young workers (especially quits), movers, despite average gains
in moving, do not catch up with wage levels of stayers. This is true mainly
of the more experienced movers.
The adverse effect of layoffs compared to quits on mobility wage gains is
not traceable to differential behavior on the prior job, insofar as it is
reflected in wage levels and wage growth:Botti are about the same prior to
separation, and lower than among (the average) stayer. However, search
behavior both on the job and off—the—job is apparently different.
Unemployment encountered by most layoffs reduces wage gains, especially if it
is prolonged. Fewer quits enter unemployment which also tends to be shorter
than in layoffs.
A search model which focuses on search efficiency, defined both as search
effort and as personal or environmental (state of the market) search
productivity is capable of explaining differential mobility wage gains by
layoffs relative to quits and by age, as well as by other characteristics such—3—
as education, marital status, national unemployment, and probably other
criteria which we have not studied. The model suggests that differences in
search efficiency create differences in duration of search (unemployment) and
in acceptance wages, as well as a negative relation between the two.
Differences in costs of search would, of ourse, create a positive
correlation. In our findings differences in search efficiency appear to
dominate.
Although the decline in wage gains of older movers is largely due to the
adverse effects of layoff unemployment (quit unemployment is not as, or not at
all, deleterious), wage gains decline with age in quits as well. The work of
Bartel and Borjas (1981) with NLS data indicates that quits which are
exogenous (for family, health, and other reasons) result in wage losses, and
so do, to a lesser extent, quits which represent trade—offs of wages for
preferred other working conditions. We find one important example of the
latter in our data: Reduced wage gains are traded off for preferred changes
in hours. The phenomenon is significant in the experienced labor force, not
so among the young. We may conclude that the reduction of wage gains in quits
of older workers is due primarily to the greater prevalence of the exogenous
and trade—off categories among them.3
II. Measuring Wage Changes in Transitions
In estimating returns to inter—firm job changes we should distinguish
short—term wage changes obtained in the transition from longer—run changes
represented by a shift in the tenure profile of wages after the move relative
to Lilac prorilein th€previous job. Job change decisions of workers are
motivatea Dy DoLuinusorgains or 1osses. ltieir reJLive 1LitpurLIee
it)eL1U5OilLfle worKers UiSCOUflt race. ore generally, IL is LilepreseuL—4—
value 01 tue netgaultiat natters. -cLtrlougrlpresent value eIie.cts 01
nobility are notestimateuin tuisStuuy, some ititerelices aboutco1parative
uaguituiles ias uetweeu younger and olner woricerS) are iliscusSeu iLleCtiOii
IV•Itsuoulu also uc uoteu tuat tue wagegains weobserve are net Or COStS
oi roregoile wa6es, but not oi nirect auG otuer costs. aniue sucn Costs may ue
iiegii6ible illJOU CilailgeWitillil tile lOCallauor iiiareL wuicuis prepuuuerant,
Susie0)/.in our uata,tucyaresurelyimportant in geograpniCuioouuity.iata
limitations preVeutcuustrotsproperlyuisuinguisiluflg uetween local anu
geograpnic inouiiity in tuepresentreport.
i,/) )norL t(uu i'iage (3ainb
HoststUuieS01 uongituuinaluata contain estimates onlyoisnort—run
wagetransitions,4 but tue quality 01 available tinaings is not secure.wage
transitions ouservable inpaneldata cover an Interval 01 at least OflCyear
uetween reports or the rlrst wage ontuenewjob aria tilelastwageon tile
01G. ince wages cuange (usually grow) tor stayers as well as br movers, a
correc.t estimate ol tue wage gain Iron moving is tile ditrerence oetween trie
actual wage gdiii 01 movers over tile interval anu tile UflOD5CIVCU but expectea
Wage gaul or siovers nantueynot noveu over tile same interval. LU tile usual
proCedure, tile coertic.LCUL 01 d job CHange Gummy ¼SL) an a wage growth
ususedto estimate tile Wage transition. snat it reaiiy measures is
tilecluitereuce between tile Wage gaul ormovers anu Wage gaLlh or stayers Dotil
uetiueu over tills particular Lime intervai lt).
uetine the wage gain 01 movers over tile interval t as anu tile wage
gaul 01 stayers over triis interval as 5s,t• tuus, toe coetticient on is
—, •wuatis icuowlias tile 'selectivity problem" is tuat wa6e growtu
01 stayers is not liKely to be tile same as cueexpecteawage groWthl ol
kt1overs, call it w15,1 nau Lucystayeu.PUt more strongly, tile coei.Eicientonteiis us now htuCil Detter (or worse) movers Idre Colitpareu to stayers, Out
Luis is anirrelevant saceVen Iauity question. It IS prima lade LaulLy,
oecauseiuy answerwoulcLsuggest Lastoneor tile otner group is acting
irrdtiolidliyii v is tue opportuu.LLy Cost 01 movers in movin6Lweare
ignoringotuer Coststiered, LtIeLi w11mustoetne opportunity costorstayers
in staying. nenceii >W5,tuesLayers areirrational, dnaConversely
11tue inequality sign is reversea. Itisirrelevant oecause economic
Optimization iueansLustmovers are coing tueir uest uy UIOVILI6 aw stayers oy
Stayiflg. Strictly spesaing this is true. cxante, as wellas, on average, cx
post, so iou6asmost people are flOL lulbieu oy inComplete. information, we
hIUSL repisce tue incorrect opportunity cost 01 moversw5 oy an estimate or
tue correct one, w
ins, L
we SIiOUiU ue Carelul to note, however, ttl.L Like UrChlotoiny 01 movers SIlO
stayers wnicn Sears on tue selectivity prouleh1 was uerineu solely br [lie
particuiar intervai t.SOme worier WilO inOVCu iLl C tony otuerwise move very
inrrequeitiy, wiale scise or tnose wno dia not may otnerwise move quite
1requeitiy. in a ionger—tert perpeCLive., Lucre is noUiCtlototiiy uetweeii
mLoverssitu stayers, Lucreisn spectrumoi WorKersranging irom tnose wuo move
rarely to tuoe WOO moVe very ireuentiy. Since avera6ejoe tenure in our
sample is deout Iyears,movers onservea in a one year intervai must nave an
aoove—averdge proLiaoility or utoving, Lust is 01 oem6repeat movers over tueir
worKin6 lives. mdccc, tneir joo tenure is on avers6e closer toyears. as
wasSuowhlin our previous stuuy, worner wtio Lena to invest more neavimy in
nutiiau capital tormationotttue joe, are iiKely to icove less trequentiy aLma to
nave steeper Wage growtu wiale oil tile jot;.uonsequeutiy, movers i periou L
snonlu nave systematically wealcer On—tue-jou growth Luau stayers in periou t.
Incoats on jot tramnin6 are Consistent; stifle all worKers 1150 an average—0--
trainingperiOu 01 i.i years, movers han training or about i.i years iiI cue
l5/b—iolannualperloas). L1eCC tile "Selectivity uias. tflccorrect
opportunitycost ot uovers is iallertfldu but it canoe
estimated 011 a subgroup 01 stayers in priou C.iflCC tile tLine period t is
ruitrary, worl(ers Who nave similar personal ctiaracteris tics incluUili6
toUiiity uenavior shoUld nave simIlar wage 5rOWLkIOiltflC joo. ii 50, We Cdii
approximate tile unouserveu rowtu or movers nan tney not hioveui Il5
i_il
period t uy cue ouserveu wa5e growtu or stdyers in perou C wno re otherwise
similar to our movers, ann wno are obsurved to move in period L--I), call
ia,ti-I I' it W •lile only uiiiereuce is cuat iLl perion t LIIC luLure movers
LhiOSC ifioViug In ti-i) stay OII tile joU./
incwage growtn equation uow contains two cnauge uUliihLieS, , Uehlotillg
separation in period t, ann ueuotin5 separation in periou ti-i, wniiu tile
dependent variable is wage growtn or all in period • is i it a move taes
place in period (t) ann u ii no move occurs in it, nor in cue next, Wulie
= I it a move occurs in period tt+l), out not in anu u ii it noes





hencetUC correcteu estimate or cue relevant wa6e gain is
bt — 0t+i — m,t — Wm,t+1 = old)
ihe uasic idea is mat ia ÷i tue wage growtn or stayers Ooserveu in
Chic period preceding their move tiu t+I) is a 6oou approxihilaclon ror cue
unoüserveu wage growth or movers in period t, nad tile, stayed oii tile JOU
inisprocedure may not elirianate tue Dias entirely, out we expect
it to provide a mucn oct ter contror tnau s in tue naive procedure, wnicn— I—
ignores cue SelCCLiVlt issue.
Lr.)kOflger—L(uri, JuuOai.u5 iii£kOUlJ.iLy
Longer—run Ciidflges in wages tesuitiu6 rroti dii inter—firm cualige iii
employment are estimaten as upwaru or dowuwaru) parallel suirts lU Like
tenure—wage prorileIncue new relative to tile preceuiu6 job. iuce we
ooserveonly initial wages on ttie new joo,tuesnhrtis basienlly an estimaLe
at tue uiltereuce between tue Starting wages Oil tue newanu tuepreceding jou,
net ot wage levels resulting trout accumulated experience. Inc same Issue oi
selectivity arises nere dS it din in estimating snort—run cuanges. our
proceaure to deal witu tnis problem is essentially tue same.IL permits us to
compare wage gains 01 movers witn wage gains oi all stayers,aswell as WiLli
wage gains 01 comparable sLayersduring tue year or tenure wnicn was loregone
bytile movers.
Dotu wage ievel anu wage CHange e.juaLions are usen 111 tile CSLI1adLLOAI 01
job gains. wage level equations areuseaseparately .tor prior ann5UU@qUilL
surveysbracKeting tue move.0 notrm equations contain tuesame separation
QUiflullieS.Lu time 1, tue coetricient on tue separation dummylUulCate3 tile
cross—secLionwage uirrereuce between ocuerwise similar movers anu stayers
prior to tue move, while in time It+ij itmeasures tIlls aitrerelltial dicer tue
LioVe.bepdiatiorl uulaliaes one year rorwaru are aducu in eacu equation to
proviae br tile control group or luture movers. Wnile tue prospective
equation tat t) indicates tile wage level selectivity ot movers,tue clirterence
betweencoerticients on tne same separation iii retrospective at t.t+1)ann tue
prospectiveequation measures tile gainIrom movingrelative to au stayers.
Incgainrelative to comparale LnexL—periou) movers is obtaineu uy
suntracting tue nitierence in coeillcieiits ontue luturemoVe iron tue
u.Lttereuce in tue coerlicients or tilecurrentmove.1t.iè prospective equaLlon—0—
tk) containin ieveis attime t ties (in aunition toothervariabies)dues
onb, tue usive intue suosequent periodann on4,tileiuove in tue
zoiiowingperiod. The duaiy on S denotestueaitterential. between wages (at.
t) ot next person aovers netoretney woven ann stayers (at. t),
4
— — .'Sueauon aenotes tue sitterential netween wages
(at t) or tnose vito was move two persons aueau,ann orstayers,
— — inrueretrospective equation ajcontainsugleveLs
at.ttitue auuy on denotes rue carsereutsai uetween wages at ttsj uetween
tuobewnowoven in tue precening period ann tnose vito a tayec,
St tti. t+L
iI
— — .1.again, tueaulunty on tueixvein cue suosequent
person,aenotes tue uizzerentsai oetween wages (atttJ.) or sucumoversann ox
St tts ttj. stayers,Ut.+it%,;tj— W5,1.
Tuewagegainormovers relative to stayers is tnererore ueasureu ny the
uitrereuce between tue numnes on bt in tuetwoequations,
St S•tti. t+L .t I.








aixrerencebetween tue wagegrowtn ox next perion movers ann or stayers is
iaeasureuDy the dirt erence between tue duaauiises on in tne two equations
K 1 tts tti t t b'bIS)D —b aiw —w)—(w—w )aw —w
t+St+i m,tti. s,t w,ttl s,t m,t+1 s,t
nencetuecorrecten estimate or wage gainsormovers is
a'As)— a( — w5,,)—t — a —Wm,tti (3e)
assC' suggests, insteaa or ratingdirrerencesnetween coerticients in
twosevei equatiOlib, we may usea wa6e cualigeequationwuicu is aeriveu rrom
tuetwolevel equations. tuis alternative proceaure is, in principle,
equivaient to tue xirst. however, estimates in thetwoprocedures way airier——
insotaras wagecnangeequations requirepanels in neignuorilig years, wuicu
reoucestue sduipie Size soutewuat, ann insordr dbtueerror StrUCtUre is
altereu. Ltuougu the estiniate 01 snort—terni gains in (L)isalgebraically
tue sanue dS tile estiuiate or longer—run "jOy gains"iiiiL),tueestiLiatesare
ueriveuin a nirrereuittilanuer; the snort—teri estiniates are deriveu iroud
waaecnauge equation inwnlcu airvdriaules otuer Luau tue separation
nunnales) are levels prior to aiov.ng. In tne jou—gain estluuates tuese variables
are in toritu or first niriereuce over tue relevant perions. iote triaL in
hirrereuciugtne innepennerit variaoles or tue level equations, tue experience
variaole oeconies A=1rorall, ann its coerricient enters tue intercept, Out
ALairters witn tflC level orexperience. The tenure variable iequalsItor
joostayers out beconies a negative—i, where 1 is lengtu or joo tenure on tile
preceuing job. inuilarly, 11 is positive br stayers, nut IS negative ann
equals br iuovers •incuse ori is tue sey to estliuuating "job" gains.
u'nen tenure levels Deture separation were ueln tixeu in tue equations, tue
liloDilityuunuutuies iuuicateutue iaore ILLulleulate wage cudu6e in nuoving rrouu one
j 00 to duOLuCL. 10 estimate 'j 00gains" ii "nero constant. 'Thepresent
specification estimates tue wage Chiau5e ironi tile prior to tue current jon at
comparabletenure revels, inertect at starting wages, assumingtue same
snapes iuut not ieVei) Or tue tenure curve ror uotn JOUS.tintsis correcteu
ror selectivity ny tue aurnnies on ruture movers.
iii. unupiricar kiuuings
i'aules 1, 1, ann3,snow rear wage gaius° rrou1i jon cuanges. laule I
snowstue snort—run gains or movers over tue year tue iliove tooK place, lauie
I snows the longer—run gain we cdii "jobgain"outaifleu ironu a \age change
Speciricatbori,ann laDle3 measures tue sanic USing pairs or wage levels— 10 —
equations"prospectIve' ann "retrospective' uracieLiug tuenove.Lu our
Lt'aLu) datatneperiod 1/'—ioicontainsa coipreilelislve wa6e aL1U salary
coverage tot stra1gnt—t1iie real wages on tue Hlain joo. inc earlier period
(11o—I)data arc restricted to wage earners (hourly rated).1' iaules I, a,
and ,wilicuextenu the period oac to 1/U, utilize a duiauy br tue 1Jb—0i
periodto distiuguisLi tuesuoperlous uotu Dy CoVera5e auuossIuieulsLorical
clii lerences •
laules 1—.) utilizecoetlicients 01uuiuuyvariaules br separations inone
andtwo adjacentperious, alter inclusion inwageredressionS ora uui,,uer Or
relevant independent varlaules. inejiect,wearedb1ll110W IuUCLI 00 14ovcr
gain relative to cohiparaole worKerswuoulu not iaove over tue periou, ailu
relative tO a noresimilarSUogroup 01sLayers,Itamely tuose who Hove iiitue
suoSeqUentperiod.
inlaDle 1 snort—run t"Lransi1.iOu")wa6eaius were estiuateu inpoolcu
wage growtfl equations. rear to year wage 6rowtu measured as lli(i) iStile
dependent variatLLe. We lOOKatnet dollar dili5 ill 5O1H 01tilesuusequent
LaDles(4,0,0)wnenwetry to ranK present valuesorgains. irotH ulovirigill
ditterentage groups. lime inuepetluent variauies, otuer titan tue separation
dummies,are snownin'laDle l.
lauleISnOWScoeiiiclentsOndUlihluieSror separaLion (n),qulLs anu
iayotts(L)brperious t alone (col. 1), andorpairs 01 dummieS inIt)and
(t+t) illcol.ta) anu i) respectively. uol. Ii) measures tue 6aiu01uiovers
relativeto all stayers ((5),wuiiecol. I4)= col.Iz) —col.t,,),measures
tilegaul Uul) relative to movers lit Itl) Who stayeu Od tile jou iii period t.
u(s) is tue coerlicient or , whiemia+, is excluded, while 0(111) is tue
iuirlerenceoetween tue coeiiicieuts 01 and snowu In col.I,L) altO I)).
IncseparatlOll auluiiiies are addedtO a list orotuer, stanuardiziug— 11—
variaolesmeasured in ttie survey prior to tuemove.Ifle variables include
education (ad), experience (A), dflu tenure (Leiij in linear ann quiuratic
terms,maritalannIieaitustatus (yIar) and (A)isaD), location variables (C1L
size,wiletuerinr'1A,geograpuic area). t15O, tfleperCeni—poluL CIlau6e in Cite
nationalunemployment rate ( U) or auult males (ages i—+)- over tue
intervalt, ann an interaction or tueseparation WiLti union metiluersuip in iy
ortue periods t anu (t+1).tacistically signiticanteltects were ooserveu
on several or tue staudaruiing varlaoles, snowu in laule Ia.wae6rowtn or
allworicers (mainly stayers in any given year), uimiriisfles with experience anu
withitenure in tue tirta, outn in aaeceierating manner ——leaturessimilar to
trioseincross—section wage profiles. tnanges in ttie adult male unemployment
rate are significant, indicating a pro—cyclical iluctutation in reai wages or
domogenous labor. ide response ot real wage cnanges to unemployment cnanges
is stronger in tue more recent period (I/o—IoI)tuanin the longer periou
oac to IlU.
Laule I snows Wage gains DeLweea Joub CaiCulateu trom coeiilcieuLs 01
mOullity dummies. rue etiects or separdtions, quits, and layotts are suown br
all worcers in tue sample, young worers (ueliueu oy at 1u05L one ueCaue 01
work experience), ann Cue oluer, more experienceu workers (ueiineu uy
x ,>10).
r'inuinsinooLu tue snorter annlonger period snow similarpatterns;
(I)Startingwitu snort—run gains in 1aole I; Wage growtn between jObSdOCS
notexceeu wage growth on—tne—jou tor tue average separation (col. 1).it is
even less tuantue wage growth orstayers, it tue separation is due to layori
amongtue more experieuceu worKers. however, tue gain in wages between jobs
relative to comparable movers wuostayed on inperiou t, shownin col.(),is
positive——again,wILn tue exception or layoirs among tue moreexperiencen
worKers.This positive gain is, tueretore, largely uue to tue tact LilaC— IL
u1oVerbnave weaKer wage growcu on ttie joD tflau stayers.
(Si)uaius01 qUiLLer are positive ann eXCeeQ gailib iroui iayots wulcu
dCsmallor ne.6ative-, especially br ttiemoreexperienceu workers. This
uespite tue tdCt,evineut Incoi.ti)Cuattoe hatter on—tue—jOu groWtu oh
movers,wOicli represents tileopportunity cost oh moving, is aoout toe same
wuetiiertfle hollowing separation is aquitor a iayoit. me aiverse eriect 01
layolts onwage growttl between joos nasoeen notedoetore,albeitinterms
similarto our coi. ij)ttiantotilemoreapropriaLe coi.'4). metinning
appears natural to some anu puzzling to otners.1
t)OainsIrohi separations,asSllOWLiin laDle I icoi. )ueciine vito age
te2perience),ootn in quits ann in layohrs. once again, toe racts are
lamiliar,aituougnOdSeUonciaversemetuouoiogies.£uwericaily, toe gains
fromseparations range from —1.8%inlayoffs ofolder workersto /.4/ 111quits
of young workers inthelonger period.
Beforewe proceed to interpretations of the findings, we turn to
estimates of longer—run effects of mobility shown in Tables 2 and 3, since
they are qualitatively similar to those in Table 1. The layout of Table 2 is
the same as that in Table 1. The coefficients on separation dummies come from
wage change regressions in vhich the dependent and independent variables are
the same as in those underlying Table 1, except that levels of experience and
of tenure are now replaced by annual changes in them.
The job gains (tenure—wage profile shifts) estimated in Table 2 are
numerically larger than the "transition" gains shown in Table 1. This is
pronounced for the younger movers, suggesting perhaps that beyond the
immediate gain, young movers gain also in wage growth on the new job.
Otherwise the pattern of profile shifts by type of separation and by age is
similar to that found for short—run gains in Table 1.— 13—
Table2A shows the significant coefficients of the standardizing
variables: Thus the coefficient of AX2 is negative. This is consistent with
a negative sign on X in Table 1A, since AX2 =2X+1.The sign of ATen2 is
similarly negative, but positive for ATen, suggesting a negative effect of
longer tenure on subsequent gain from moving. Increases in unemployment
reduce wage growth as before, though the effects are smaller than in the
shorter—run. Interactions of union membership with separations are generally
positive, probably reflecting moves from non—unionized to unionized firms.
Table 3 shows the job gain (profile shift) estimates obtained by using
prospective (P) and retrospective (R) wage functions in successive cross—
sections.15 G5, the gain relative to allstayers, is the difference between
separation coefficients (Rt — inrow (3) minus row (1); Gms ——thegain
of future movers relative to current stayers is (R+i — row(4) minus
row (2); and Gm ——thegain of movers relative to comparable (next period)
movers is (Rt — — (Rt+i— i.e.rows (3 —1)—(4—2).16
It is reassuring to find that the numerical estimates of the relative
gains G in Table 3 are quite close to those in Table 2. The conclusions are
therefore the same as in Table 2. There is, however, additional information
in Table 3, namely observations on wage levels of movers and stayers before
and after the move. Thus the fact that all coefficients in rows (1) through
(4)arenegative means that movers have lower wages than stayers both in the
old and in the new job, although the discrepancy is reduced by moving. Also,
prior to moving the wage disadvantage (relative to stayers) is about the same
for quits and for layoffs (row 1 in Table 3).In conjunction with the
findings in Tables 1 and 2 to the effect that wage growth on the job is about
the same for quits and layoffs, it would seem on the whole that there is no
significant difference in on—the—job wage experience of quits and layoffs— 14—
priorto separation.
By moving young quits make up the bulk of the deficit, while older quits
cut it in half only. Young layoffs remove less than half of the deficit,
while older layoffs worsen it if they change it at all. Apparently, it is
behavior during the transition rather than on the job that distinguishes quits
from layoffs. Since mobility does not compensate for the slower wage growth
on the job of frequent movers, their wage trajectories are flatter, and even
flatter for those movers whose separations are dominated by layoffs. However,
in the long run more frequent movers are not distinguishable by quits or
layoff. No significant correlation between frequency of moving and relative
frequencies of quits to layoffs was found among movers in the PSID.
Interaction Effects
Mobility wage gains differ by type of separation and by age, according to
Tables 1—3. Do mobility wage effects differ also by other characteristics,
such as education, experience, tenure, and so on? To detect these
interactions we restrict our observations to episodes of moves. In Table 4,
in the upper panel we show relative wage gains as before. In the lower panel
we show dollar wage gains. In both panels we look at wage changes during the
move (in period t) and before the move (at t—1). The latter are substitutes
for the wage change of stayers who will move in t+1.
We find that both the relative and dollar gains differ by education,
tenure, by health, by location (in SMA), and less significantly by experience
and by marital status. These results are qualitatively similar in the percent
and dollar measures, and are stronger when lagged wage effects (coefficients
in (t—1)) are subtracted from current effects (in t) which refer to current
movers without reference to any comparison group.— 15—
Gainsfrom job mobility increase with education, mainly because gains
from quits do. In relative terms the effect of education is negative only in
layoffs of young workers. Note also, in col. (t—1), that more educated
workers tend to quit jobs which are relatively inferior (in terms of wage
growth), and gain more by moving, the more inferior the previous job was.
Gains decline with tenure in a decelerating fashion. They are reduced in ill
health, and they are smaller in SMAs. They are larger (certainly in dollar
terms) for married than for single men. Experience effects are negative and
near significance when health variables are left out.
Recessions (increases in national unemployment) have a stronger negative
effect on wage growth of movers (—3.77 in Table 4 as compared to —2.5% in
Table 1A) than on wage growth of stayers. Thus, the cyclical variability of
real wages is greatest for movers and declines with experience (and/or tenure)
among stayers (Table 1A). Lesser cyclical fluctuations in wages may be
expected of workers who have accumulated more firm—specific capital than
others, or, more generally, carry greater fixed labor costs to employers. The
comparative findings on movers and stayers, young and old, and early vs. later
tenure are consistent with this hypothesis.
IV.WageChanges and Unemnt in Job Transitions.
1. Why do gains from quits exceed gains from layoffs?
As was noted in Tables 1—3, gains from quits exceed gains from layoffs in
all groups and periods, both in the transition and in the job sequence. The
differential is rather stable. Gains from quits exceed gains (or losses) from
layoffs by about 4% points. A dummy for (layoffs=1, quits=O) included in the
wage change equations for moves only, indicates the difference. It is shown
in Col. 1 of Table 5.— 16—
Explanationsof the disadvantage of layoffs in the transition are put
forward by several analysts. Cline (1980) argues that quitters move from
inferior jobs when better jobs become available, while involuntary separations
(layoffs) affect workers in both inferior and superior jobs. The implication
is that the pre—separation wage levels are, on average, higher for layoffs,
while post—separation wages are about the same. Our findings in the
prospective and retrospective regressions of Table 3 show exactly the
opposite: Pre—separation wages of both quits and layoffs are about the same,
both significantly lower than wages of stayers, while post—separation wages,
although not equal to wages of stayers, are lower for layoffs than for
quits. Rosen argues against the asymmetry between layoffs and quits inhis
preface to NBEk volume (19b1): "Who initiates the turnover decisionshould be
irrelevant, since job separations should occur if and only if productivity on
the current job is less than productivity on an alternate job." Rosenadds
the speculation that perhaps layoffs are more heavily selected from unstable
sectors, hence a greater average loss (or lesser gain) maybeexpected for
layoffs than for quits. This assumes higher (compensatory) wages in unstable
sectors and (some) moves from unstable to stable sectors: While our
prospective regressions are consistent with the symmetry argument, they reject
the unstable sector hypothesis.
A hypothesis that may explain the larger gains of quitters, relies on job
search behavior: Most quitters change jobs directly without intervening
unemployment, while most layoffs are unemployed between jobs. The implied on—
the—job search of quitters carries a reservation wage which exceeds the wages
on the old job (abstracting from non—wage components of the real wage
package), while the reservation wage of the laid—off unemployed searchers is
lower:'7 Thestartingwage on the new job may, but need not, be higher than— 17—
onthe old job. In our data 2/3 of quits changed jobs without unemployment,
while about the same proportion of layoffs became unemployed. If reservation
wages are indeed lower for unemployed than for employed searchers we should
find that the reduction in wage gains due to unemployment isgreater than that
due to layoff. This is shown in Table 5, comparing col. 2 with col. 1.
The disadvantage of searching while unemployed is less significant for
quits than for layoffs (compare col. 4 with col. 6), especially among the more
experienced workers. Quit into unemployment is deliberate ——itis likely to
be prompted by high costs of searching on—the—job. It therefore indicates the
intent to search more intensively. Moreover, the intensity of search by
unemployed quitters is likely to be strengthened by lack of unemployment
compensation for which layoffs are eligible. Indeed, average duration'8 ot
layoff unemployment is almost twice as long as of quit unemployment (Shown in
Table 7).
If intensity of search of unemployed quitters is greater than that of
those on layoff, it should also follow that for the same length of search
quitters should be more successful in locating a better (higher wage) job.
This is confirmed in our regression (Table 5) in which a duration variable is
added to the unemployment dummy: The coefficient on duration is not
significant for quits, but is negative and significant on layoffs. That is to
say, that each additional month of unemployment reduces the acceptance wage of
unemployed layoffs by an additional 2.8%. Apparently, longer duration
reflects lesser or decreasing efficiency of search'9 of those laid off, but
not of those who quit,
2. Why do gains from moving decline with age?
(a) Incidence and Duration of Unemployment
According to Table 1, short run gains from separations of experienced— 18—
workers(X > 10) are much smaller (about a third) than gains of young
workers. The reduction is somewhat less in quits (about a half), but goes
from positive to negative in layoffs. The use of percent gains may, of
course, be misleading. It is possible for the net dollar gain (thedifference
between the dollar gains of movers and the dollar gains of the control—group)
to increase when the percent gain declines. Table 6 below shows that the
gross dollar gain from moving of young workers was larger than the
corresponding gain of older workers. This implies that the net dollar gain
declines as well, given the decline in the percent measures2° (Gm).
As Tables 2 and 3 indicate, the decline in Gm with age is even greater in
our job gain estimates, which are conceptually closer to present values.
One reason for the decline in the wage gain of the older job changers is
that a greater proportion of them experience layoff. The ratio of layoffs to
separations is close to 70% among the older workers, compared to about 50% for
the younger ones. And, as was shown in Table 5, the effects of unemployment
are especially severe for laid off older workers, and more so in prolonged
unemployment, which is more typical of laid off workers. It follows that the
differential effects of unemployment, especially in layoffs explains both the
wage gain differences between quits and layoffs, and the declines of gainsfor
older job changers.
An explanation of all these patterns, already alluded to, may be found in
differential efficiency of search by type of separation, age, education or
other characteristics of workers or labor markets. Greater efficiency in
search may be a matter of personal efficiency, or greater intensity of search,
or of a more favorable environment. We define it as the probability (p) of
finding a vacancy (whether or not the job is ultimately acceptable) per unit
of time. Of course, p is a function of resources invested in search and of— 19—
theenvironment, but it will suffice for our purposes to treat it as a
parameter:
2
In the terminology of search models, we argue that, on average, older
workers who separate from jobs have a lesser probability of finding a jobper
unit of search time, not because they are holding out for a higher acceptance
wage within the relevant wage offer distribution (though it is true of some),
but because the probability of getting any offer, that is, the probability of
finding a vacancy, is smaller. On this assumption we can show that older
workers who separate will search longer when unemployed, and quit less
frequently, while their acceptance wage will be relatively lower, so the wage
gain will be smaller for older job movers than for younger ones.
In the initially standard search model, the individual samples from his
wage offer distribution f(w) receiving one offer per unit of time. The worker
decides on an optimal wage floor which equates the gain from an additional
unit of search to the cost of it. The resulting rule is:
(1)p(T —W)=c a a a
where Wa is the lowest acceptable wage, a is the probability of getting an
acceptable wage offer, that is, of W > W, Wa the mean of all acceptable wage
offers; c is the (marginal) cost of search which includes opportunity and
other costs. Income offsets z which are contingent on a continued search,
such as unemployment compensation, enter costs with a negative sign. Expected
duration of search D is inverse to In this model search is longer the
higher the acceptance wage, which is higher the lower cost of search.
However, the probability of accepting a wage offer must be redefined
given that the probability of finding any offer in a unit period can be less
than 1. A lesser frequency of vacancies may be a result of depressed business
conditions in general, or depressed markets for a particular type of labor, or— 20—
afunction of lesser efficiency or intensity of search. The optimum condition
becomes:
(2) p aa —w) = c
Here p is the probability of finding a job offer, a the probabilityof
finding an acceptable job conditional on finding a vacancy, and is the
probability of finding an acceptable job. D is now the inverse of the product
As before, changes in c produce a positive relation between Wa and D.
However, changes in p over the business cycle, or differences in p across
people, are likely to produce a negative correlation between Wa and D.
A reduction in p leads to a downward revision of Wa hence to an increase
in 1aThe question is whether will rise or fall when p declines. No
perfectly general answer can be given to this question, but a most plausible
answer is that will fall, hence the duration of search will lengthen
even though Wa is revised downward in consequence of a fall in p. It is easy
to see that the difference (W —W)increasesas W is lowered in a uniform
or triangular wage offer distribution. When Wa is reduced, a is reduced by
a smaller amount, so that must fall if c is fixed or reduced.
The conclusion that a lower p is very likely to produce longer search and
lower acceptance wages holds both for unemployed and for employed searchers.
An increased duration of search on the job, of course, means a reduction in
the frequency of quit.
In sum, workers facing fewer vacancies in their search may be expected to
have a longer duration of search and a lesser wage gain when unemployed, and
to inhibit their job change (quitting) when employed.2 These conclusions are
consistent with worker behavior during the business cycle: duration of
unemployment increases and quits decline while layoffs increase, partly
because employment demand declined and partly to substitute for a decline in— 21—
attrition(quits).
Applying the same model to the life—cycle, we may argue that either p or
c declines at older ages. A decline in c is not plausibe except very early
when labor market entrants become eligible for unemployment compensation. A
decline in c would lead to increases in Wa and in wage gains, but the opposite
is implied by a fall in p and is observed. The implications that older men
have a lesser tendency to quit, a reduced Q/L ratio, and a lower Wa when
changing jobs are confirmed in our data.
The longer duration of unemployment of older workers is a well known
feature of national statistics. In our data this fact is observed in Table 7,
in which duration of unemployment of unemployed job changes is regressed on a
number of variables. In col. (1) and (3) where the variables are restricted
to education and experience, duration initially decreases (over the first half
a dozen years of experience) then increases with experience. When tenure and
other variables are added in Col. (3) and (5), it is lengthening of tenure
that appears to be responsible for the increased duration of unemployment by
age. Apparently, unemployed older movers with longer tenure face greater
hardships in job search ——afact consistent with the smaller wage gains of
longer tenured movers, observed in Table 4. It is also consistent with losses
of firm and industry specific capital due to structural changes affecting
older, longer tenured workers in manufacturing industries especially.
Sectoral information as well as that on plant closings is required to probe
these matters more deeply.
Looking at the other variables, Table 7 also shows that duration of
unemployment diminishes with education. The hypothesis that the efficiency
parameter (p) increases with education is therefore consistent with both
implications of the search model: greater wage gain (Table 4) and shorter— 22—
durationof unemployment. Similarly duration increases with the level of the
national unemployment rate (Table 7) and wage gains decline (as we saw in
Table 4). Here p reflects the decline of vacancies in recessions. Effects of
health disabilities and of marital status similarly fit the search model:
longer duration of unemployed and smaller wage gain of the disabled, and the
converse for married compared to single men. Finally, if unemployment results
from layoff, its duration is 70% longer than if it results from quit, and as
shown before, the wage gain is far smaller.
(b) Why deains from quits decline with age?
Although the lesser gains from mobility can be in large measure
attributed to unemployed search, wage gains decline also in quits where
unemployment plays a minor and not necessarily deleterious role. In their
study of NLS data, Bartel and Borjas (1981) were able to classify quits into 3
categories: (1) for personal or family non—market reasons, such as change in
health, in family status, and so on), (2) for reasons of dissatisfaction with
working conditions, which they call HpushTl, and (3) "job—related real wage
maximizing reasons which they call upull!!.Their findings are shown in
Table 8. Quits in the first 2 categories led to lesser wage gains or to
losses, and the incidence of them was greater among old workers (age over 45
in the NLS) than among the younger ones: 75% vs. 57%. Although the gains
estimated by Bartel ana Borjas are calculated relative to all stayers,
therefore probably understated, the differential patterns of gains by age are
consistent with our estimates.
The distinctions within quit categories are not available in our data.
However, the role of changes in non—wage conditions can be explored in one
rather important case, which fits the Bartel and Borjas category (2), namely— 23—
whenthe job change contains a significant change in hours per week. The
different wage—hours schedules offered in different jobs, firms, or industries
are due to various technologically and administratively conditioned systems of
coordination of the production process, as well as to the presence of fixed
labor costs which differ among firms. Consequently, desired changes in hours
are more likely to be accomplished in job transitions than within the
firm.2 Where the change is in the directionopposite to the desired one,
workers must be compensated by an increase in the wage. When the change in
hours is in the desired direction, workers are willing to trade off some of
the acceptance wage for the preferred change in hours. Note that the negative
effect of wages applies whether or not the desired change is negative or
positive, and that the trade—off applies to search and match mobility rather
than to moves in response to wide—spread shifts in demand. In the latter case
wages would rise with increases in hours and decline with decreases. Thus, if
most of job changing which is associated with significant changes in hours, is
not in response to demand fluctuations and is in the direction of preferred
hours, we should expect to see a negative effect of absolute (positive and
negative) changes in hours schectules on the wage gain.
In Table 9 we find that coefficients on the interaction of separations2
and change of hours in wage gains is negative, suggesting that trade—offs
dominate in moves with sizable changes in hours (hrs> 5 per week, in
absolute value).
We find also that changes in hours do not significantly affect wages of
young workers. Apparently job matching and experimentation applies to work
schedules and other working conditions during the early years of work
experience.2 Since reports on hours worked are conceptually less reliable
for salaried than for hourly rated workers, we show separately effects of— 24—
changesin hours in the sample of wage earners. The results are equally
significant, despite the smaller sample size. More importantly,the effects
are observed not merely on starting wages. The effects on the longer run
("job") wage gains are at least as clear and significant.
In demand fluctuations hours decline in downturns and so do real hourly
wages, but the opposite is true in upswings. To testwhether we were not
confounding effect of utility trade—offs with demand fluctuations, we also
distinguish increases from decreases in hours. If a negative sign onthe
latter dominates, we may have misinterpreted our findings as a utility trade-
off. We find, however, that each of the changes carries a negative
coefficient, not significant for the young, but significant for workers with
more than 10 years of experiences. The trade—off is a 3 to 6reduction in
wage for over 5 hours change in work schedule for wageand salary earners. It
is between 5 and 8% for wage earners alone.
The illustration of effects of changes in hours on wage gains fits
category (2) of the Bartel and Borjas classification of quitsshown in
Table 8. The preponderance of "personal" and "push" types of quits among
older workers explains the anomaly that gains from quits decline with age in
both relative and dollar terms. It is an apparent anomaly, because a
declining payoff period would require increases in gains to induceworkers to
move. Note that this requirement is indeed fulfilled in the "pull" category
of quits. Here returns to strictly wage motivated quits are twice as high in
dollar terms for the old movers than for the young ones. The percent gain is
about the same. If the gains are assumed to be permanent, the present value
of older quits is probably not smaller than that of the youngermovers.— 25—
Footnotes
10f course, the dispersion is not small. Hence significant numbers of movers
incur losses.
2Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) provide the human capital explanation and limited
empirical evidence. Much stronger evidence is shown in Mincer (1984).
3According to Table 8, about half of quits of young workers are mainly wage
maximizing ("pull"). This is true of only one quarter of older quits.
4me exceptions are Borjas and Rosen (1980), Cline (1980), Mincer (1983) and
Polachek and Horvath (1977). These studies differ both in methodology and in
population coverage.
5One exception is the DIME—SIME data set, in which intervals are as short as
one month (Mortensen and Neumann, 1985).
6Mincer (1984).
7Although one mightusethe wage growth of movers in the year before they
moved, W'' instead of W"1, there are several disadvantages due to
difference in (calendar) period, non—linearity in tenure—wage profiles, and
significant loss of observations, given short tenure of movers.
8This approach was used also in Mincer (1983) in the study of union effects on
wages.
9Among the other independent variables listed in Table lA.
10Wages and salaries on the current, main job, were divided by scheduled hours
and deflated by the CPI.
11Hourly rated wages were truncated at $9 before 1978, causing some (small)
biases.
fact, most of the estimates in the shorter period are similar to those in
the longer period.
13 This index ofunemployment is not affected by compositional changes in the
labor force, and it is less likely to reflect supply responses to the business
cycle, as do some of the other demographic components of the aggregate unem-
ployment rate.
14 Bartel andBorjas (1981) term the differential effect of quits and layoffs
"not surprising," while Rosen in his introduction to the 1981 volume calls it
"a puzzle".
15Theseequations exhibitthe usual coefficients found in cross—sectionwage
functions.
16 Seep. 8 above for derivation.
17Recall unemployment is excluded from our data, by definition.— 26
'8Our measures of duration of unemployment in Tables 5 and 7 are weeks
unemployed during the year when job change took place. This may represent more
than one spell, and may create some inaccuracy.
'9Although job changers do not, by definition, return to their previous jobs,
some of the unemployed may have expected recall. These expectations may wane
as duration lengthens, resulting in a drop in the reservation wage.
20 Let thegross dollar gain of movers be g and of the control group (movers
who stay) g8. The net dollar gain is therefore g =g—g5.But
=g/1+G,so =g(1-1/1+G)
=gx GmI1+Gm It follows that
the net dollar gain g declines with age if g does, even if Gm is the same.
For to remain the same or to increase, g must rise at least as fast as Cm
declines. The decline in Gm is therefore not merely a matter of arithmetic.
It does indicate a decline in the gross dollar gain. Indeed, the relative
measures (Gm) shown in Tables 1—3 would have to increase with age to keep the
net dollar gain from falling.
21This parameter is called the "arrival rate" (of offers) in the mathematical
search literature. In the version that follows, the model was described in
Mincer and Leighton (1982).
22Barron (1975), Feinberg (1977), and Nickel (1979) analyze wider classes of
wage offer distributions, with similar results. These distributions belong to
a more general class of log—concave probability distributions, including
uniform, triangular, normal, and exponential among others. Proofs that such
wage offer distributions generate a negative correlation between our p and D
are given by Flinn and Heckman (1983) and by Burdette and Ondrich (1985).
23We need not assume that p is exogenous. It may decline as a result of the
search process (e.g. Salop, 1973). The distinction is immaterial for our
purposes.
24 SeeAltonji and Paxson (1985).
25Altonji and Paxson have similar findings for quits of workers who
previously expressed the desire to change hours.
26Jso, moves toward higher wages in preference to other components of the
job dominate the mobility of young compared to older workers according to
Table (8) below, taken from Bartel and Borjas (1981).
27 Let i be the discount rate,g0 and g the dollar gains of old and young
movers respectively, and R the remaining payoff period in years. R10 for the
older movers in the NLS, while R=40 for the young, which is almost infinity
for discounting purposes. For the present values of older quits to be no less
than for the younger, the following inequality must hold:
1/i[1 —(1/1+i)R1g0> (1/i)g
[1 —(1/1+i)101> 1/2, hence (1/1+i)° < 1/2, 50(1+1)10> 2
The inequality holds for i > 7%, a quite realistic condition.— 27—
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Short Run Wage Gains in Job Change
Annual, 1970—1981
Separations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
G(s) St S4 G(m)
All —.005 .0034 —.035 .039
n=7,246 (.6)* (.4) (3.9)
Young .024 .031 —.033 .064
n=2,689 (1.8) (2.3) (2.7)
Older —.032 —.022 —.043 .021
n=4,571 (2.4) (1.5) (3.1)
- - Quits —
Gs t+l G(m)
All .010 .019 —.034 .053
n=7,246 (.9) (1.7) (3.1)
Young —.006 .024 —.050 .074
n=2,689 (.4) (1.4) (3.1)
Older .020 .027 —.019 .046
n=4,571 (1.3) (1.7) (1.3)
Layoffs
G(s) t+i G(m)
All —.036 —.026 —.044 .018
n=7,246 (2.4) (1.6) (3.0)
Young .009 .008 —.049 .057
n2,689 (.4) (.8) (2.6)
Older —.071 —.059 —.041 —.018
n=4,571 (3.2) (2.6) (1.8)
Conventional t—statistics in parentheses.
(1) Gains relative to stayers (St÷i not in the equation)
Young =Experience< 10 yrs
(2) Coefficient on separation in t Older =Experience> 10 yrs
(3) Coefficient on separation in t+1
(4)Gainsrelative to movers. (col. 2 —col.3)— —
Table_1A













D(76—81), 1 if in 76—81
n.s. =notsignificant
All Young
Variables 1976—81 1970—81 1976—81 1970—81 1976—81 1970—81
Old
C .097* .097* .130* .104* .079 .096*




















































































































Job Gains in Mobility (iln wage) 1970—1981
S epa rat io iis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
G(s) S1 G(m)
All .032 .040 —.032 .072
(3.0) (3.3) (3.5)
Young .089 .099 —.044 .143
(4.2) (4.4) (3.1)




All .044 .056 —.030 .08o
(3.6) (4.0) (2.8)
Young .113 .130 —.052 .182
(5.0) (5.4) (3.2)
Older .028 .038 —.016 .054
(1.6) (1.9) (1.0)
Layoffs
C(s) Lt Lt+l G(m)
All .007 .008 —.041 .049
(.5) (.5) (2.7)
Young .059 .057 —.039 .096
(2.4) (2.1) (1.7)




(1) Gains relative to stayers
(2) Coefficient on separation in t
(3)Coefficient on separation in t+1
(4) Gains relative to movers.— 31—
Table2A
Variables in Job Gains (A) Regressions
All Young Old
1976—811970—81 1976—81 1970—81 1976—81 1970—81
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C .64 .63 n.s. n.s. .066 .067
(2.7) (3.8) (22) (3.4)
Ax2 -.001 —.0008 -n.s. -.0033 -.001 -.0007
(5.0) (6.2) (2.4) (3.7) (4.0)
—.018 —.014 —.018 —.015 —.016 —.012
(3.3) (4.5) (1.7) (2.5) (2.6) (3.5)
ZTen .017 .011 .072 .061 n.s. .004
(2.1) (3.8) (4.9) (5.7) (1.4)
ATen2 -.0004 -.0004 -.005 -.004 n.s. n.s.
(2.4) (3.1) (3.0) (3.6)
D(76—81) -.018 n.s. -.025
(3.2) (4.0)Table 3
Job Gains in Mobility
Prospective (P) and Retrospective (R) Cross—Sections
197 0—1981
-All





Rt —.109 —.082 —.148
(8.6) (5.5) (7.7)





































G(s) .060 .098 .026
G(m) .123 .167 .083Table 3 (continued)
Older ________
Equation S _____ L
Pt —.122 —.119 —.112
(6.2) (4.9) (3.6)






G(s) .039 .062 —.023
G(m) .048 .062 —.006
S =separations,Q= quits,L =layoffs
Other independent variables listed in Table 1ATable 4
Effects of Mobility on Wage Gains




A(t)a At(t_l)b At(t) At(t—l)
Ed .068 —.048 .0767 —.088
(1.9) (2.1) (2.0) (3.2)
Ed2 —.0024 .002 —.0028 .0036
(1.7) (2.1) (1.8) (3.1)
Ten —.028 —.011 —.037 n.s.
(2.2) (1.8) (3.4)
Ten2 .0017 .0005 .002 n.s.
(2.7) (1.8) (3.4)




At(t) At(t—1) At(t) (At(t—1)
Ed .85 —.66 1.002 —1.071
(4.5) (4.5) (4.1) (4.9)
Ed2 —.032 .026 —.037 .041
(4.1) (4.3) (3.7) (4.6)
Ten —.095 —.063 —.127 n.s.
(1.8) (1.6) (1.8)
Ten2 .006 .002 .008 n.s.
(2.1) (1.4) (2.2)
AU —.15 n.s. —.13 n.s.
(2.4) (.9)
Note: Of the additional variables (listed in Table 1A) Disability was
negative, Marital Status positive, both nearly significant. Experience
variables had the same signs as Tenure (at t) but were not significant when
Tenure was included.
*Layoff variables had the same signs as separations, but were less
significant.
aAt (t) wage growth in move
bAt (t—1) wage growth a year before moveTable 5
Effectsof Layoffs and of Unemployment
on Wage Gains
Sample of Job Changes, 1970—1981
Separations— Quits Layoffs
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
L U D U D U D
All —.046 —.070 —.011 —.050 —.008 —.064 —.014
n=1,082 (2.1) (3.2) (3.1) (1.6) (1.3) (1.8) (3.0)
Young —.044 —.060 —.008 —.038 —.014 —.036 —.007
n675 (1.5) (2.1) (1.7) (1.1) (1.2) (.6) (1.1)
Older —.041 —.085 —.016 —.064 .007 —.119 —.025
n=407 (1.3) (2.7) (3.2) (1.3) (.6) (2.3) (4.3)
Col. (1)Coefficient of dummy for Layoff =1,Quit=0.
(2) Coefficient on dummy for Unemployment in Transition =1,
No Unemployment 0.
(3) Coefficient on duration of unemployment measured in 2—week
intervals, linear terms only, in addition to dummy as in (2).Table 6
Average Relative and Dollar Wage Gains
of Subgroups, by Age and Separation
1970—81 Separations Quits Layoffs
Wage Gains 70 $ 70 $
Young 4.7 .129 5.3 .154 1.6 .090
Older 3.5 .104 4.2 .121 .9 .030
1976—81
Young 3.7 .134 4.5 .160 2.6 .091
Older 2.7 .096 3.0 .103 .9 .038Table 7























Wage Changes by Type ofQuitin NLS Data
Type of
Quit: Personal Push Pull
Measure 7 Pc 7 $ p 7 $ p
Younga 12.8 —.365 .15 .6 .034 .42 6.9 .30 .43
Oldb -19.5 -.46 .27 -2.8 -.097 .48 7.1 .60 .25
aAt most 30 years old.
bAt least 45 years old, not retired.
CProportion of quits in each category.
Source: Bartel and Borjas (1981), p. 68, Table 2.1am job gain equations.
Table 9
Interaction Effects of Separation
and Changes in Hours on Wage Gains
(1970—1981)










(B) Wage Earners Only
All Young Older
—.022 n.s. —.058
(1.5) (2.9)
—.026 —.061
(1.7) (2.9)
—.026 n.s. —.076
(1.4) (2.9)
—.026 n.s. —.047
(1.5) (1.8)
Short Run Gains
Job Gains
H > 5a
H < ...5a
Short Run Gains
Job Gains
H > 5a
H < 5a